



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

File: SNIE

Soviet in Pak

July 8, 1981

SECRET/NOFORN

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard Lehman
Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: Philip H. Stoddard *PHS*
INR/CA

SUBJECT: Request for SNIE on Soviet Threat to
Pakistan

During the past month Community analysts have been deeply involved in coordinating a threat briefing for Pakistani officials, including a possible presentation for President Zia in Islamabad. A briefing was prepared for the Pakistani military delegation next week, but Ambassador Hummel informed us that the Pakistanis were not interested in an intelligence briefing during the talks. The whole project is now on hold.

During the coordination efforts with DIA and CIA on the briefing, it became apparent that there is a wide range of views on the likelihood of a Soviet military move against Pakistan, as well as the military options open to the Soviets.

There are also differing views on Pakistani military capabilities and attitudes about the Soviet threat. These attitudes in part account for differences on what the US/Pakistani defense relationship should be in the near- and long-term.

Before divergent intelligence agency briefings and assessments surface (in particular on the Hill), we think a SNIE would be advisable. We suggest that it cover the following issues.

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State Dept. review completed

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A. Soviet military options

- Air and/or ground force raids to destroy insurgent camps and pressure Pakistan;
- Limited seizures of Pakistani territory;
- Invasion of Pakistan.

B. Preparation and warning time estimates for various military options

C. Factors influencing Soviets to take or not take military action against the insurgents in Pakistan or against Pakistani forces

D. Capabilities and likely response of Pakistani forces to various Soviet military options

The major policy issue, of course, is that of the supply of F-16s to Pakistan. We would hope that the SNIE could lay out the threat and Pakistan's capabilities. Much of the analysis has already been completed in DIA, CIA, and INR.

Gary Crocker of INR has been informally coordinating the interagency effort thus far, and would be available to assist in the drafting process.

For maximum utility to the policymakers, the SNIE should be available within a month.

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